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This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients
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between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous
employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows
us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of
exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving
Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this
result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe
the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers
make a strategic use of UI.
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I. Introduction
Unemployment spells can end with the worker
finding a new job or being recalled by the previous
employer. In Spain, more than a third of jobless
workers return to the firm where they were previously
employed (Alba et al., 2007).1 One possible explana-
tion for firms recalling workers after a spell of
unemployment is the existence of firm-specific human
capital (Pissarides, 1982). Firms have to lay-off
workers in periods of sluggish demand and recall
some of the workers when their benefits are about
to lapse. Running out of benefits makes workers
more likely to accept a new job (Juradja, 2003).
However, the extent to which a worker’s search
strategy is mirrored in the firm’s recall decisions is an
empirical question that motivates a separate estima-
tion of the recall and new job hazards.
In Spain the Unemployment Compensation System
(UCS) does not contain any element of ‘experience
rating’ for contributions. This provides an incentive
for firms to adjust their labour demand through
lay-offs and recalls. In a context of implicit
re-employment contracts between workers and
*Corresponding author. E mail: josem.arranz@uah.es
1Recent work has found recalls to be prevalent in Europe (Fischer and Pichelmann, 1991; Jansson, 2002; Jensen and Svarer,
2003; Mavromaras and Orme, 2004). See, in addition, Robertson (1989) for Canada and Katz and Meyer (1990) for the
United States.
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firms, the recall hazard rate is expected to rise
as the time of unemployment benefit exhaustion
approaches. The ‘spike’ in the re-employment rate at
the expiration of unemployment benefits is inter-
preted as evidence that recipients wait until their
benefits run out to return to work – one of the best-
known empirical results in public finance and labour
economics (see, e.g. Card et al., 2007).2
A better understanding of the recall behaviour is
important for labour market policy and measures
addressing joblessness. Many studies have stressed
that individual transitions out of unemployment
depend on the extent to which recall by the previous
employer is expected (Jensen and Westerga˚rd-
Nielsen, 1990; Corak, 1996; Rosholm and Svarer,
2001; Jensen and Svarer, 2003; Røed and Nordberg,
2003). In Spain, research on unemployment duration
has exclusively focused on the generosity of the UCS
without distinguishing recalls from new job hazards
(Alba, 1999; Bover et al., 2002; Gonzalo, 2002;
Jenkins and Garcı´a-Serrano, 2004; Arranz and
Muro, 2007; Arranz et al., 2009).
In this article, we study unemployment exit rates
around benefit exhaustion. Specifically, we first
examine the hypothesis that recalls are synchronized
with the expiration of unemployment benefits, using
selected data on unemployment benefit recipients in
Spain from 2000 to 2002. Employer identifiers in our
data set allow us to distinguish unemployment spells
ending in new jobs from those ending in recall.
Second, prior Spanish literature on unemployment
duration has only used information on the duration
of insured unemployment – which is a censored
estimate of the duration of the jobless spell and,
therefore, a poor proxy for the actual time a worker
spends without a job (e.g. Arranz and Muro, 2004,
2007; Jenkins and Garcı´a-Serrano, 2004; Arranz
et al., 2009). In this sense, an important departure
of our study is that we construct a data set that
measures the duration of unemployment, instead of
only the length of benefit receipt. We are, therefore,
not restricted to analysing exit rates just prior to
benefit exhaustion, because we observe the length of
the spell during which each worker is actually jobless,
instead of only the duration of the unemployment
benefits he/she receives – i.e. our data set allows us to
know when the unemployed enter employment, either
before or after exhausting the unemployment bene-
fits. Therefore, our study also extends the existing
Spanish UCS literature in terms of data quality.
Finally, we distinguish between the contributory
system – Unemployment Insurance (UI) – and the
assistance system – Unemployment Assistance (UA).
UA constitutes a different benefit scheme aimed at
workers whose contribution period falls short of
qualifying for UI. This distinction is made mainly for
two reasons. First, these two schemes differ as
regards their characteristics and objectives. On the
one hand, UI is received by unemployed individuals
who have worked for a minimum time period
(12 months) and its level depends on the worker’s
previous earnings. On the other hand, unemployed
persons who are not entitled to UI might receive UA,
so that the main objective of UA is to target the
unemployed with a low income in order to reconcile
the objective of social equity. UA entitlement
depends on whether the individual has family bur-
dens, and the benefit level is based on the Statutory
Minimum Wage (SMW) (see next section). Whereas,
UI usually allows job seekers to receive offers with
more attractive wages (and, therefore, to secure more
productive jobs), UA recipients make up a more
disadvantaged group in the labour market because
they have had less job experience than UI recipients.
For this reason, UA recipients are expected to have a
weaker attachment to their former employer. By
distinguishing between UI and UA and between
recall and new job exits from unemployment, we
make a novel contribution to the literature because
previous research on recall duration has not distin-
guished between the two types of benefits (Røed and
Nordberg, 2003; Alba et al., 2007; Fallick and Ryu,
2007).3 In addition, the existent studies on UA have
exclusively analysed the work disincentive effects
arising from the UA scheme, without distinguishing
between recall and new job durations.4
Our main conclusion is that the UI recall hazard
significantly rises at the point of benefit exhaustion.
2 See, for instance, Katz and Meyer (1990). For analyses of unemployment duration when benefits are near exhaustion
although the following studies do not distinguish between exits from unemployment through recall or through a new job see,
e.g. Fallick (1991) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), who show that the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on
the hazard out of unemployment decreases over time, or Micklewright and Nagy (1998), Stancanelli (1999), Bratberg and
Vaage (2000) and Puhani (2000), who do not find any rise in the hazard near benefit exhaustion.
3Although Alba et al. (2007) also distinguish between recall and new job exits rates, our analysis differs from theirs in several
dimensions. Apart from dividing the sample according to the type of benefits received by the unemployed (either UI or UA),
we have information on the level of these two types of benefits and on the individual’s unemployment duration beyond the
exhaustion point. Therefore, we are able to know when the unemployed enter employment, either before or after exhausting
the unemployment benefits.
4 Studies that analyse the effect of UA on exits from unemployment are scarce. See, for example, Earle and Pauna (1998),
Erbenova et al. (1998), Stancanelli (1998), Micklewright and Nagy (1999) or Arranz and Muro (2007).
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That is, many job seekers are indeed waiting to
return to work when their UI elapses. Thus, this
article provides the first evidence for Spain on a
significant influence of firms’ recall policies as
determinants of the duration of workers’ unemploy-
ment benefit spells: the length of time that workers
collect benefits is affected by firms’ recall decisions.
In contrast, the recall hazard rate among UA
recipients does not increase around the time of
UA exhaustion.
The article is organized as follows. Section II gives
a brief description of the Spanish UCS. Section III
describes the data and variables. Section IV presents
the competing risks duration model. Section V
disentangles the estimation results for UI and UA
recipients. Finally, conclusions are given in
Section VI.
II. The UCS in Spain
The Spanish UCS is composed of two parts: UI and
UA. On the one hand, individuals who have lost their
job involuntarily – including the end of fixed-term
contracts – and have worked for 12 months or more
during the 6 years preceding unemployment are
eligible for UI benefits. Individuals who have
worked for 12–17 months can receive UI for up to
4 months. Those who have worked for 18–23 months
can receive up to 6 months, and so on up to a
maximum of 24 months of UI for those who have
worked for 72 months or longer (Table 1). The
amount of UI is determined as a percentage of the
average wage in the 12 months preceding
unemployment: 70% during the first 6 months of
unemployment and 60% for the remaining period of
eligibility. The minimum amount is 75% of the SMW
if the worker has no dependent children (100% if he
has dependent children). There is also a maximum
equal to 170% of the SMW, which is raised to 190%
(220%) if the unemployed person has one (two or
more) dependent child (children).
There are two key institutional differences between
the UI systems in Spain and those in other countries.
First, the absence of experience rating in the Spanish
UI tax system. As a result, the unemployment benefit
system contains a subsidy element that can lead to an
extensive use of recalls. Since UI claimants expecting
to be recalled have less of a tendency to search for a
new job,5 individuals may repeatedly cycle between
UI and employment with the same employer. For
instance, some individuals might work for the min-
imum amount of time needed to qualify for benefits
(1 year), collect benefits for as long as possible (up to
4 months), be recalled to the previous employer and,
finally, repeat the cycle. Thus, instead of searching for
a new job, UI recipients may wait for a recall from
their previous employer as of the time the benefit is
exhausted. At the same time, employers may syn-
chronize their recall decisions according to the
unemployment benefit entitlement because laying
off a worker with a high potential entitlement is less
costly to the firm than laying off an equally produc-
tive worker with a low potential entitlement – the
former will be less likely to find a new acceptable job
with an alternative employer than the latter
(Pissarides, 1982).
The second notable characteristic of the UCS in
Spain is the availability of UA6 for individuals in the
following situations: (1) did not meet the minimum
contribution period for eligibility; (2) exhausted UI
and has family dependents; (3) returned from foreign
migration; (4) was released from prison; (5) an
invalidity spell ended by the labour authority declar-
ing the worker able to take a job; (6) aged 52 or older.
Of these seven potential situations, we focus on the
first one, since our data set only includes UA benefit
recipients who do not meet the minimum contribu-
tion period for UI eligibility. The level of UA has
no relation to previous individual monthly wages.
A family income criterion is used whereby per capita
family income must not exceed the SMW. A flat rate
equal to 75% of the SMW is paid to all beneficiaries
with one or no family dependents, 100% with two
and 125% with three or more. The receipt of UA is
time limited and is conditioned on which of the
above-indicated situations the worker is in (Table 1).
Thus, due to their larger prior tenure, their ensuing
larger firm-specific human capital and their larger
levels of unemployment benefit entitlement, UI
recipients are expected to have a stronger attachment
to their previous employer through recalls. In essence,
one may expect the opposite recall outcomes when
comparing UI and UA recipients – i.e. firms will
prefer to recall UI recipients as they approach the
5 It should be stressed that recall is always just a possibility and never a certainty. Unfortunately, we only refer to temporary
lay offs in an ex post sense i.e. job separations ending in recall. We have no information on ex ante temporary lay offs i.e.
those that begin with a person expecting to be recalled. In any case, this ex post concept gives the proportion of
unemployment from spells involving no job change (Feldstein, 1975; Clark and Summers, 1979), and it is not ambiguous in
the sense that it is not based on whether individuals decide on what is a new employer and what is not (Alba et al., 2007).
6As in most European countries; see Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for Slovenia; Winter Ebmer (1998) or Lalive et al.
(2006) for Austria or Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) for Germany.
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exhaustion of their benefits.7 This will cause lower
search intensity on the part of UI benefit recipients
and lower hiring costs for the firm. The result is
increased job attachment while at the same time
permitting flexible employment adjustment and
reduced risk of losing training investments.
III. Data, Variable Definitions and
Descriptive Analysis
The data
The data have been extracted from the Integrated
Benefits System (Histo´rico del Sistema Integrado de
Prestaciones, HSIPRE), a Spanish administrative
data set that provides information on the unemploy-
ment benefits received by each worker. We use a
sample of job losers who entered unemployment
under benefits from January to June 2000 – the
Spanish UI coverage is rather large (Blanchard et al.,
1995; Toharia, 1997; Jenkins and Garcı´a-Serrano,
2004). The quality of this data set is deemed to be
high; being administrative in nature, the information
is free from the problems common in survey data
(such as nonresponse and interviewer bias) (Jenkins
and Garcı´a-Serrano, 2004; Arranz and Muro, 2007;
Arranz et al., 2009). It includes information on the
type of benefits received, the claimant’s initial enti-
tlement, the current unemployment benefit duration,
the number of children the individual has, the
monthly benefit amount and the individual’s previous
earnings.
Unfortunately, the HSIPRE follows recipients only
for as long as they collect unemployment benefits.
Furthermore, this data set cannot distinguish spells
ending in a new job from those ending in a recall. We
overcome these deficiencies by merging employment
records from the Spanish Social Security (SS) with
the HSIPRE. These SS records are reported by every
employer (registration with the SS is obligatory for all
workers) and include workers’ entire employment
and unemployment history from June 1999 to June
2002. Since each firm is issued with an (anonymous)
identification number – which is separately recorded
for every single spell of employment – starting from
Table 1. The UCS in Spain
Period of contribution in months
Duration of benefits
in months
Amount of benefits as a percentage of
the SS base contribution
Panel A: Contributory system (UI)
1 11 0 70% (first 6 months of benefits)
12 17 4 60% (remaining period of benefits)
18 23 6
24 29 8
30 35 10
36 41 12
42 47 14
48 53 16
54 59 18
60 65 20
66 71 22
72 24
Duration of benefits in months
Period of contribution in months With family burdens Without family burdens
Panel B: Assistance system (UA) for workers noneligible for UI
1 2 0
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 11 21 6
7 In any case, one may think that UA recipients in some senses may compete with UI recipients to be recalled. One way to test
this possibility would be to include in the estimation for UI (UA) recipients a variable collecting the proportion of UA (UI)
recipients that each company recalls in each period of time. However, this variable would be biased because our data set does
not collect every unemployed being recalled by each company in the period of analysis.
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the unemployment spells under consideration in the
year 2000, the recipients’ previous and subsequent
spells of employment were identified. Thus, we can
distinguish recalled workers from those who changed
jobs. In addition, the combination of the two data
sets allows us to cover not only the period when
workers are covered by unemployment benefits but
also the period of transition from unemployment to
employment when benefits expire. The SS records
contain information on the benefit recipients belong-
ing to the HSIPRE data set regarding their age and
gender, the qualifications required for the job, the
duration of the unemployment spell, the reason for
termination of each spell (voluntary/involuntary or
retirement), the province of residence of the worker,
an identifier of whether employment spells are
accomplished through a Temporary Help Agency
(THA) or not, the type of contract held by the worker
(temporary or permanent) and the firm size.
From the initial sample, we drop individuals who
do not meet all the following criteria: (1) entered
unemployment due to involuntary reasons – i.e.
dismissals or termination of temporary contracts.8
As we consider only the first spell of unemployment
occurring in the indicated period, we obtain a ‘flow
sample’ of unemployed workers in the terminology of
Lancaster (1990, p. 162); (2) in the previous job, the
individual was registered with the General SS
Scheme; (3) the individual started receiving UI or
UA; (4) workers must remain out of work for more
than 30 days. We eliminate workers with unemploy-
ment spells lasting 30 days or fewer because they have
had movements from job to job without experiencing
unemployment. Finally, since the law contemplates
early retirement at the age of 52, we limit our sample
to workers aged between 16 and 51 years old.
Deleting observations with missing variables
(Table A1 in the Appendix shows the loss of
observations from the initial data set), we are left
with a sample of 5992 individuals (corresponding to
36 282 individual-spell observations), 3981 of which
ended in a new job (66.43%), 1650 of which returned
to the same employer (27.54%) and 361 of which
were still unemployed at the time of the data
extraction or were artificially right censored at 18
months (6.03%).9 Therefore, recalls – i.e. returning to
the same employer – constitute an important element
of the unemployment under benefits in Spain.
Table 2 shows the means for selected variables by
re-employment outcome and for UI and UA recip-
ients separately. As expected from Section II, these
two groups of recipients are markedly different. For
instance, the presence of high qualification levels, as
well as permanent contracts, is larger among UI
recipients, while UA recipients (particularly those
who re-enter employment through a new job) have
held many more previous jobs on average than UI
recipients (and, therefore, have suffered more
turnover).
As Table 2 shows, short unemployment spells
usually end in a recall. The average duration of an
unemployment spell is shorter for both types of
recipients who are recalled than for those who find a
new job. Finally, men and younger workers are more
likely to change employers.
Variable definitions
Benefit-related variables. We define a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 for each month that the worker
receives UA and zero when UI is received. The
impact of unemployment benefits on the hazard is
also measured using functions of the time until the
benefits lapse.10 We include time until benefit exhaus-
tion dummy variables for seven intervals covering the
months before and after the benefits expire. These
variables are designated ‘UB418’ through
‘UB410’. Each of these time-varying exhaustion
dummies takes on the value of one in its designated
interval and the value of zero in all other periods. For
example, ‘UB12–18’ takes on the value one when the
individual is 12–18 months until exhaustion; ‘UB0’
takes on the value one on the day of benefit
exhaustion; ‘UB 5 to 10’ takes on the value one
8We cannot distinguish between these two reasons for job termination. Nevertheless, we have information on the type of
contract held by the individual in his previous job. Workers with permanent contracts are expensive to dismiss, so when they
are laid off they are unlikely to come back or to be called back. In addition, a great majority of workers in Spain become
unemployed because of the end of their contracts. We understand that the end of a contract is not exactly the same thing as
being laid off. By contracting with fixed term contracts, firms have no need for temporary lay offs. Workers who quit their
jobs (i.e. end their employment for voluntary reasons) are not considered in this study because they can access neither UI nor
UA (Section II).
9 There is a small number of individuals with durations greater than 18 months. In order to avoid noise in the results, we
artificially right censor these observations at 18 months. In addition, although a spell of unemployment can end with an exit
from the labour force, the data set does not include an identifier for this possibility. Anyway, observations beyond 18 months
are censored, so we regard this inconvenience of the data set as being of minor relevance.
10Although the replacement ratio is available, it has not been included because it is problematic to include both the time to
benefit exhaustion and the replacement ratio as covariates. The reason is that the replacement ratio drops to zero after the
benefits expire (so those variables are probably highly collinear and the estimated effects become imprecise).
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Table 2. Main descriptive statistics
UI benefit recipients UA benefit recipients
Variable
Recall
Mean
(SD)
New Job
Mean (SD)
Censored
Mean (SD)
Recall
Mean (SD)
New Job
Mean (SD)
Censored
Mean (SD)
Males 0.466 0.580 0.451 0.316 0.484 0.324
Worked in a THA in previous job 0.020 0.021 0.007 0.016 0.039
Qualification level
High 0.099 0.087 0.088 0.024 0.035 0.013
Upper intermediate 0.110 0.152 0.162 0.093 0.099 0.052
Lower intermediate 0.260 0.360 0.391 0.242 0.320 0.208
Low 0.531 0.401 0.359 0.641 0.545 0.727
Mean age at unemployment spell(years) 33.232
(8.360)
31.481
(8.097)
32.789
(7.643)
34.718
(8.594)
31.303
(8.692)
32.182
(8.396)
Unemployment duration 4.556
(3.385)
6.108
(4.483)
5.424
(3.374)
6.283
(4.559)
41 month and 4 months 0.567 0.427 0.423 0.399
44 months and 1 year 0.375 0.438 0.519 0.460
41 year 0.058 0.134 0.058 0.140
Type of contract in previous job
Permanent 0.050 0.216 0.394 0.018
Discontinuous open ended contracts 0.086 0.010 0.136 0.031
Temporary 0.801 0.726 0.570 0.715 0.921 0.987
Other contract type 0.062 0.048 0.035 0.148 0.031 0.013
Number of previous jobs 1.935
(1.464)
1.690
(1.064)
1.468
(0.715)
1.957
(1.441)
1.977
(1.345)
1.623
(0.795)
Number of children
0 0.600 0.697 0.511 0.495 0.637 0.364
1 0.194 0.151 0.243 0.196 0.145 0.208
2 0.162 0.123 0.187 0.223 0.154 0.298
3 0.043 0.029 0.060 0.085 0.062 0.129
Firm size (number of employees)
10 0.243 0.363 0.440 0.215 0.355 0.428
410 and 50 0.271 0.315 0.271 0.274 0.308 0.259
450 and 200 0.233 0.171 0.162 0.261 0.219 0.208
4200and 1000 0.150 0.113 0.109 0.175 0.089 0.091
41000 0.104 0.039 0.018 0.074 0.027 0.013
Entitlement period
3 months 0.049 0.027 0.013
4 months 0.425 0.327 0.271 0.058 0.021 0.013
5 months 0.039 0.018
6 months 0.213 0.171 0.095 0.832 0.899 0.922
8 months 0.103 0.124 0.053
10 months 0.071 0.068 0.042
12 months 0.064 0.064 0.070
14 months 0.035 0.037 0.046
16 months 0.017 0.035 0.035
18 months 0.016 0.022 0.049
20 months 0.019 0.021 0.035
21 months 0.021 0.034 0.052
22 months 0.017 0.025 0.056
24 months 0.021 0.105 0.247
Average entitlement period (months) 7.568
(4.906)
9.750
(6.688)
13.296
(8.139)
6.018
(2.346)
6.368
(2.805)
6.714
(0.339)
Sample size 1274 3275 284 376 706 77
Note: SDs are in parentheses.
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when the individual is 5–10 months after benefit
exhaustion.
Sociodemographic variables. Apart from gender, we
include in the estimation the individual’s age at the
start of the unemployment spell. The oldest unem-
ployed persons are in possession of skills that are
more prone to becoming obsolete, and they are
expected to experience more difficulties in adapting
themselves to a new job – and, therefore, to stay
unemployed for longer (Narendranathan and Nickell,
1985).11 Although no information on marital status is
available, we do have the individual’s number of
children (which is a proxy for being married). On the
one hand, individuals with children are expected to be
more eager to accept any job and those without more
able to afford a prolonged job search (the former may
also search more intensively for a job, due to their
family responsibilities and their subsequent need for
more income).
Previous job variables. We consider variables asso-
ciated with the previous job held by the individual,
such as the industry, the type of contract held, the
firm size and whether the individual was hired
through a THA or not. In addition, our data set
does not contain variables related to the individual’s
educational attainment or occupation, but the
required qualification level in the previous job (a
proxy for the educational level). It indicates a
position in a ranking determined by the worker’s
contribution to the SS. Therefore, although it is
somewhat related to the individual’s qualification
since it reflects the worker’s professional category and
salary, it does not reveal the worker’s level of
qualification, but rather the level of qualification
required for the job.12 As in previous studies using
data from the SS records, we group those 10
categories into four groups (Table A2 in the
Appendix). We have no ex ante expectation about
the effect of this variable on the hazard out of
unemployment: on the one hand, the higher the
worker’s qualification level, the higher his/her reser-
vation wage and thus the lower the probability of
accepting a job offer; on the other hand, employers
may prefer those unemployed with higher qualifica-
tion levels (as they expect greater productivity), so
that the probability of exiting from unemployment
may be higher.
In addition, we have information on the number of
previous jobs held by the individual.13 This latter
variable collects the number of jobs held prior to the
one leading to the spell of unemployment under
study, since the database includes the complete
employment history of workers from June 1999. It
provides us with a measure of the number of times
they suffered unemployment from that date. On the
one hand, individuals more accustomed to moving
jobs may supposedly be more ‘employable’ (and
therefore be expected to leave unemployment earlier),
but, on the other hand, such behaviour may signal
instability to potential employers (and, thus, they
may exit from unemployment later).
We are able to distinguish whether or not the
individual entered unemployment from a job with a
fixed-term contract, with a permanent contract or
with a discontinuous open-ended contract. The latter
type of contract allows for interruptions of the labour
relation due to seasonality. These interruptions (typ-
ically, in autumn and winter) are covered either by
working in a different industry or by receiving
unemployment benefit receipts. In other words,
when each season ends, workers hired under discon-
tinuous open-ended contracts may be laid off, but
they expect an implicit recall by the same firm in the
following season. Thus, workers under this latter type
of contract enjoy a strong relationship with their
previous employer during the lay-off; this relation-
ship is much stronger than with other types of
contracts, since individuals retain seniority and other
employment-related benefits (for instance, they have
the right to return to the same job with the same
employer, since they have the privilege of being
approached first by their previous employer on their
availability to re-enter their payroll). In addition,
when being laid off, those individuals receive pay-
ments subsidized by the government (through the UI
system for the time spent unemployed).
We finally control for the industry in which the
worker was engaged in the previous job; some
industries may have more fluctuations in demand or
supply than others, which means that the tendency to
use recalls as a means of smoothing labour force
adjustments may be relatively high, other things being
equal. Nevertheless, we expect that workers in the
11 The oldest unemployed normally accumulate more labour experience, which generates a higher reservation wage (Folmer
and van Dijk, 1988).
12 It may be the case, however, that a worker with higher education is far below the category that would correspond to his
formal education. For instance, an individual working in the lowest category, ‘labourers’, may well be in possession of an
academic degree.
13 Tenure in the previous job is not included in our estimations because of the high correlation between this variable and the
benefit entitlement variable (Section II).
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service and construction industries will face expand-
ing employment opportunities and higher chances of
finding a job. Such industries are characterized by the
highest proportions of temporary employment in the
Spanish economy. Since worker turnover is high,
individuals usually move very frequently from one
job (through recalls) to another, and job tenure is
usually short.
As regards firm size, its impact is included through
five dummy variables: 10 workers, 410 and 50
workers, 450 and 200 workers, 4200 and 1000
workers and41000 workers. Two relevant factors are
associated with firm size: the effectiveness of workers’
representatives and the cost of lay-offs for the firm.
Workers’ councils (comite´s de empresa) can only exist
in firms with at least 50 employees (Jimeno and
Toharia, 1993). In larger firms, therefore, the relevant
legislative constraints that determine the size and
effectiveness of the workers’ councils are considerably
more restrictive with respect to the optimizing
behaviour of firms (Mavromaras and Rudolph,
1998). Given the costs borne by workers in recalls –
in terms of losses in current income, future benefit
entitlements, employment security and human capital
depreciation during lay-offs – councils are expected to
minimize the duration of recalls effectively in larger
firms. Moreover, smaller firms can be expected to
experience longer recall durations because workers
employed by smaller firms will be less able to
influence the timing of such recalls. As the firm size
increases, there will be more and stronger workers’
councils with both the power and the incentive to
intervene and assist workers’ optimizing behaviour.
Other variables. Regional labour market and house-
hold conditions are also taken into account, through
dummies for the 17 Spanish Autonomous
Communities and the quarterly regional unemploy-
ment rate as a time-varying covariate. We expect that
the unemployed who live in regions with low regional
unemployment rates will enjoy a higher probability of
finding a job since there will be less competition for
existing vacancies.
Finally, seasonal effects are captured by a set of
dummy variables indicating whether workers entered
into unemployment in January to February, March
to April or May to June. Finally, a duration
dependence pattern through a number of monthly
dummies used for the baseline hazard specification is
included for each exit rate.
Nonparametric analysis
Empirical job finding rates – distinguishing between a
new job and a recall – are shown in Fig. 1(A) and (B)
for UI and UA recipients, respectively (the standard
errors were used to construct confidence bands in the
figures). The estimate in a given month is the
proportion of the number of unemployed who make
a particular type of transition to the number of those
individuals who are still unemployed in that month.
In constructing these figures, we make the conven-
tional assumption of independent competing risks
(e.g. Katz and Meyer, 1990); the hazard plot for
recalls treats job starts as censored, while the hazard
plot for new job starts treats recalls as censored. As
Fig. 1(A) shows, the new job finding hazard overall
slightly decreases among UI recipients (except for
some spikes that might reflect imminent exhaustion
of entitlement) up to the 11 months of unemploy-
ment; from this month onwards, the new job hazard
rate increases throughout the course of the spell. On
the other hand, the recall hazard rate also has a
declining behaviour up to the 11th month, shows a
notable spike around the first year of unemployment,
and finally declines just after the 13th month,
remaining close to a flatter line from the 14th
month onwards. Among UA recipients (Fig. 1B),
the new job hazard increases at an accelerating rate
from the 13th month onwards, and it remains above
the recall hazard, except for the 8th month of
unemployment.
We now study the effect of the potential duration
on the exit rates from unemployment. Figure 2(A)
plots the proportion of UI recipients who find a new
job and who are recalled to their previous job.
Figure 2(B) shows the corresponding series for
individuals eligible for UA. A positive integer in the
x-axis indicates that some months remain before
benefit exhaustion, while a negative integer indicates
that some months have passed since benefit exhaus-
tion. Among UI recipients (Fig. 2A), the new job exit
rate is always above the recall exit rate. Moreover, the
recall exit rate gradually increases when 5 months
remain to exhaustion and up to the month of benefit
exhaustion (corresponding to time 0). On the con-
trary, the new job exit rate only increases up to the
moment when 3 months remain to benefit expiration.
From then on, the likelihood of both finding a new
job and being recalled diminish. On the contrary,
among UA recipients (Fig. 2B), both the new job and
the recall exit rates are at relatively low levels in the
months immediately preceding exhaustion. In addi-
tion, there are no apparent spikes around benefit
exhaustion either among individuals who are recalled
or among individuals who find a new job.
In essence, the increasing recall rate at exhaustion
among UI recipients (Fig. 2A) suggests that recalls
serve as persuasive evidence of the strategic use of
compensated unemployment by both workers
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and firms. The rise in the recall rate begins some
months before exhaustion and vanishes after the final
month of the claimant’s entitlement. Thus, recalls are
likely to be retimed in order to coincide with the
expiration of benefits (compared with the finding of
new jobs), and after UI benefit exhaustion, the longer
a worker remains unemployed, the lower is the recall
(and new job finding) probability. Thus, if the UI
recipient is not recalled at benefit expiration, she will
be substantially less likely to be recalled thereafter,
consistent with the hypothesis of Katz (1986). On the
contrary, UA recipients mainly re-enter employment
(either through recall or through finding a new job)
once some months have passed since benefit
expiration. Thus, the strategic use of the
unemployment benefit is not so apparent among
UA recipients.
IV. A Competing Risks Duration Model
We specify a discrete-time duration model with
competing risks of exits following the formulation
0
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New job hazard Recall hazard
Fig. 1. Kaplan–Meier hazard rates from unemployment into recall or a different employer: (A) UI recipients and (B) UA
recipients
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
proposed by Allison (1982) and used and extended by
Steiner (2001), Lauer (2003) and D’Addio and
Rosholm (2005), among others. This type of model
is common in the analysis of temporary lay-offs
where all the unemployed are subject to the
competing risks of a recall and a new job (Katz,
1986; Røed and Nordberg, 2003; Alba et al., 2007).
To model the transition from unemployment to
employment through recall or a different employer,
we define the discrete hazard rate with competing
0
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Fig. 2. Benefit expiry effect on exit rates. Recall versus new jobs: (A) UI recipients and (B) UA recipients
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
risks for each different kind of event as (Allison,
1982)
hijðtÞ ¼ Pr½Ti ¼ ti, J ¼ j jTi  ti ð1Þ
where ti is the length of individual i’s unemployment
spell; i¼ 1, . . . , n are individuals. The unemployment
spell can end, T¼ t, in any of j states: j¼ 1
(re-employment through a new job) or j¼ 2
(re-employment through the same employer as the
immediately previous one; that is, a recall takes
place). Each observation continues until time ti, at
which point an event occurs or the observation is
censored. Unemployment spells that are still in
progress at the end of our sampling frame (i.e. no
transition out of unemployment has been observed
until duration T) are treated as right-censored obser-
vations. For these observations, both destination
indicators are 0. It is assumed that the time of
censoring is independent of the hazard rate for the
occurrence of events, at least after controlling for
other factors. It is also assumed that the set of two
states at which unemployment spells end is absorbing
and equal for each person.
Assuming that the competing risks are
independent, the hazard rate from unemployment is
given by
hiðtÞ ¼
X2
j¼1
hijðtÞ ð2Þ
Assuming that all spell observations are
independent, the likelihood function for the original
state j can be written in terms of hazard rates as
follows (Allison, 1982, p. 88)
L ¼
Yn
i¼1
Y2
j¼1
hijðtÞ
ð1 hijðtÞ
 ij Yt
k¼1
ð1 hikÞ
" #" #
ð3Þ
In this expression, we suppose that individual i
experiences event j at time ti or else is censored at ti.
As usual, the indicator function i equals one if an
event occurred at time ti (complete duration) or else is
censored at ti. Therefore, the first component of (3)
captures the transition rate and the second
component is the survivor function.
Given that (3) is a function of the transition rates,
we just need to specify the dependence of the latter on
a set of explanatory variables. For the hazard rate we
choose the logistic specification that, with multiple
events, generates the multinomial logit model
(Maddala, 1983). It allows for the three possible
states considered: employment through a different
employer; employment through recall and remaining
unemployed (which is the reference state category).
For individual i, the transition rate to state j in period
t specified as a multinomial logit can be written as
(Steiner, 2001; D’Addio and Rosholm, 2005)
hj ðtjzðtÞ, "j Þ ¼
expðD0ðtÞj þ Z0ðtÞ0j þ "j Þ
1þP2m¼1 expðD0ðtÞm þ Z0ðtÞm þ "mÞ
ð4Þ
where Z(t) is a vector of explanatory variables that
may vary with time;  the vector of parameters to be
estimated;  stands for the baseline hazard that
captures the duration dependence. For the specifica-
tion of the baseline hazard, we choose a piecewise
constant hazard approach by specifying monthly
dummies D(t), of which the coefficients for transi-
tions to employment through recall can differ from
those for transitions to employment through a
different employer. Finally, in our analysis " accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity characteristics in the
model such as motivation, ability, effort, etc. We
assume that " is destination state specific, time
constant and independent of the observed
characteristics.
The contribution to the likelihood function for
a single individual is equal to (D’Addio and
Rosholm, 2005)
Lð,j"Þ ¼
Yt
k¼1
exp
ðD0k1 þ Z0k1 þ "1Þq1k

þðD0k2 þ Z0k2 þ "2Þq2k
 
1þP2m¼1 expðD0km þ Z0km þ "mÞ
ð5Þ
where qjk are indicators for making the transition to
each of the possible destination states at time k:
re-employment through a different employer from the
immediately previous one (j¼ 1) or though the same
employer (j¼ 2). Unemployment spells in progress at
the end of the observation period are right-censored
observations and for these observations, both desti-
nation indicators are 0. In Equation 5 we assume that
unobserved heterogeneity is discretely distributed
with unknown support points (see Heckman and
Singer, 1984, for the advantages of this distribution).
Then, the likelihood function for an individual may
be obtained by integrating the following conditional
likelihood distribution:
Lð,, ",Þ ¼
YS
s¼1
Lð,j" ¼ sÞðsÞ ð6Þ
where " are the location points (that can be inter-
preted as intercepts for the baseline hazard function),
 the probability associated with them and s the
number of support points. In the following section,
we estimate this likelihood function by maximum
likelihood to discover how individual and labour
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market characteristics influence unemployment spell
durations via recall or a new job.14
V. Estimation Results
According to the estimation results for the entire
sample (Table A3 in the Appendix), UA recipients
re-enter employment later via recall and through
finding a new job than UI recipients. In particular,
UA recipients are 25% less likely to re-enter employ-
ment via recall than UI recipients. Thus, UI recipients
enjoy greater attachment to their former employers,
since they expect to be recalled sooner than UA
recipients. This finding is consistent with the existence
of implicit contracts between firms and UI recipients:
firms prefer to rehire first individuals whom they
already know and value (which is typical of UI
recipients). Thus, it is important, as already pointed
out in Sections I and II, to analyse the re-employment
behaviour of UI and UA recipients separately. For
this purpose, Table 3 presents the estimation results
for these two groups of unemployed individuals
separately.
The estimations are obtained based on the likeli-
hood function (6) by the maximum likelihood
estimator.15 Given that both support points are
highly significant in any specification of the model,
exit rates into recall or new jobs are affected not only
by the measured individual and job characteristics of
the unemployed, but also by the unobserved charac-
teristics of the unemployed. Estimated coefficients
and the value of the log-likelihood are affected by the
inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular,
unobserved heterogeneity increases the log-likelihood
values in the estimations, which indicates an improve-
ment in the fit of the model.16
Interesting insights arise from the time until
exhaustion variable. In particular, the effect of
entitlement benefit duration on the hazard rate out
of unemployment is different according to the route
taken back to work. UI recipients exit through recall
faster as the moment of benefit exhaustion
approaches. The recall hazard rate for these individ-
uals has a large spike at the point of benefit
exhaustion (it is more than three times larger than
in the reference period). Moreover, it remains large in
the four months after benefit exhaustion. Thus,
among those UI recipients who are recalled, this
outcome is expected to be more likely to occur either
at the moment of benefit exhaustion or once their
benefits have run out to return to work. In contrast,
although the hazard rate into a new job for these
individuals also rises as the moment of exhaustion
approaches, it is less than twice as much as the
reference period on the day of exhaustion. This
behaviour reflects the joint effect of a falling reser-
vation wage and rising job search intensity as the UI
is close to exhaustion (Mortensen, 1977). Similar
evidence has been found in other empirical studies.
For instance, Card et al. (2007) also found for Austria
a large spike in the exit rate at the point of benefit
exhaustion (for both new jobs and recalls), and that
the hazard rose only slightly thereafter.
In contrast, the recall hazard rate for UA recipients
is lower as benefit exhaustion approaches, at the
moment of benefit exhaustion and thereafter (relative
to the reference period). Therefore, not only are UA
recipients less likely to exit from unemployment via
recall than UI recipients (as previously commented
on), but also their recall is not being timed according
to the impending exhaustion of UA benefits. In
addition, the new job hazard rate for UA recipients is
not significantly different depending on the remaining
period to exhaustion. This result underscores the
importance of distinguishing between the effects of
UI and UA programmes on the decision of recipients
to exit from unemployment to a recall or a new job.
In addition, most of the sociodemographic vari-
ables have different effects on the two hazard rates.
The time profiles of the recall and new job hazard
rates differ by gender, age, the qualification required
by the job and the number of children. Men have a
14We perform a test (available from the authors upon request) for the assumption of ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’
(IIA) through the Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984, HM) and Small Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, SH, 1985). In
both tests, the null hypothesis of IIA is not rejected; therefore, the multinomial logit specification shows no indication that it is
inappropriate for each arrival state (new job or recall). In addition, a Wald test and an Likelihood Ratio (LR) test are
performed (also available from the authors upon request) in order to examine the null hypothesis that the coefficients of each
category do not differ significantly from each other, for all the possible combinations. The rejection of the null hypothesis
means that it is adequate to distinguish between exits into a new job and exits into a recall job; therefore, the competing risk
specification seems to be appropriate, since none of the categories should be combined.
15We use an identification theorem of Han and Hausman (1990), which gives conditions under which the competing risk
model is identified even if the covariates for each risk are identical. The identification condition basically requires the presence
of at least two continuous variables among the covariates. Our estimation includes several continuous variables: age, age
squared and the regional unemployment rate.
16A simple LR test of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against another without unobserved heterogeneity confirms the
conclusion that unobserved heterogeneity is significant (these tests are available from the authors upon request).
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larger cause-specific hazard for exiting from unem-
ployment through a new job (under both types of
benefits). However, males who receive UI are less
likely to be re-employed by their previous employer
than women. Age is an important determinant of
recall hazards among UI recipients. As age rises, the
lower the recall hazard rate is, up to a minimum of 25
years old (from then on, the hazard rises). This
negative impact on the recall hazard rate for the
youngest unemployed is most probably caused by
demand-side effects; employers do not desire to rehire
persons with insufficient firm-specific human capital
(given the high cost of acquisition in the open
market). In addition, it is possible that young workers
are deliberately searching for new jobs that match
their preferences more accurately (which may very
well vary for young persons). Moreover, the UI
recipients with the highest qualification levels are
more likely to exit from unemployment through
recall, while the qualification level presents a nonsig-
nificant impact on the recall hazard rate for UA
recipients. Finally, the number of children is another
significant variable: individuals without children exit
sooner to a new job than the remaining ones, which
may suggest that they are more willing to accept job
offers (in essence, they are more mobile). In contrast,
evidence exists of a null effect of the number of
children on the recall hazard rate.
As regards the variables collecting the characteris-
tics of the job previously held, firm size plays an
important role. As stated in Section III above, for
both groups of benefit recipients, the larger the firm
size is, the higher the recall hazard rate is. A likely
interpretation is that individuals employed by smaller
firms will be less able to influence the timing of their
recall outcome; whereas, workers’ councils in larger
firms will be able to favour workers’ optimizing
behaviour. In addition, the individuals’ new job
hazard rate is also larger in relatively large firms
among UI recipients, but not among UA recipients.
Concerning the industry of employment, UI recipi-
ents in services suffer a lower transition rate from
unemployment into a recall job than those in
manufacturing. This result is expected in as much as
workers previously employed in manufacturing (and
particularly in larger firms) move from one job to
another with relatively high frequency. We also
appreciate that workers receiving UI and who have
worked in the services industry are more likely to find
a new job.
The duration of recall spells is shorter for benefit
recipients who have held either temporary contracts
(among UI recipients) or discontinuous open-ended
contracts in their previous job (among both UI and
UA recipients). This is reasonable, to the extent that
workers under discontinuous temporary contracts
enjoy a stronger relationship with their previous
employer while they are unemployed. Thus, they do
not usually engage in job-seeking activities because
they regard themselves as employed and may be
virtually certain to return to their jobs at the end of
the lay-off period. As a result, benefit entitlement
creates incentives for employers to offer fixed-term
rather than permanent contracts.
Finally, as regards the state of labour market
demand, the unemployed who receive UI and live in
regions with a lower regional unemployment rate
enjoy a higher probability of finding a recall job, since
there may be less competition for existing vacancies in
their respective locations.
As regards duration dependence, Fig. 3(A) shows
the predicted hazard rate at the means of covariates
for UI recipients, while Fig. 3(B) does so for UA
recipients (after controlling for observed and unob-
served heterogeneity). As we will see, the fact that the
hazard rates for these two groups of benefit recipients
show different duration dependence patterns illus-
trates the danger of estimating a single risk hazard
rate, instead of a competing risks model. Among UI
recipients, the estimated hazard for finding a new job
lies above the estimated recall hazard rates. This
result is sensible to the extent that recalls may carry a
higher wage due to the accumulation of firm-specific
human capital – see, e.g. Fallick and Ryu (1997). The
new job hazard rate shows no clear duration depen-
dence up to the 11th month; from then on, positive
duration dependence is apparent. Presumably,
increased search activity as unemployment duration
lengthens results in increases in the new job hazard
rate. In contrast, the recall hazard rate first rises up to
the second month and then shows a decreasing
pattern.17 A likely interpretation of the fact that the
likelihood of being recalled is more likely during the
first months in unemployment is that firms’ risk of
losing employees on temporary lay-off increases with
unemployment duration; as a result, this makes recall
by the employer earlier. These results are, therefore,
coherent with those found by Katz (1986), Katz and
Meyer (1990), Corak (1996) and Jensen and Nielsen
(1999).
17 Similar results are also detected by Katz (1986) and by Fallick and Ryu (2007), who in their analysis of unemployed persons
with and without UI benefits find that the new job hazard rate more or less increases over the course of the unemployment
spell and the estimated recall hazard rate exhibits negative duration dependence.
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Among UA benefit recipients (Fig. 3B), the hazard
of finding a new job is above the recall hazard rate.
Given that the majority of UA recipients in our
sample are entitled to 6 months of unemployment
benefits, we observe that there is an increase in the
4th month of unemployment in the UA recall hazard
rate but we appreciate no increases in the recall
hazard rate either at the moment of benefit exhaus-
tion or 1 month before or after benefit exhaustion.
Therefore, we conclude that there is no duration
dependence in the recall hazard rate among UA
benefit recipients. Finally, among UI benefit recipi-
ents, a spike in the 5th month of unemployment for
transitions into a new job is observed.
VI. Conclusions
In this article, we have examined the re-employment
probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients in
Spain. Our focus has been on how the unemployment
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Fig. 3. Estimated hazard rates from unemployment into recall or a different employer, after controlling for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. Predicted values are obtained at the means of covariates: (A) UI recipients and (B) UA recipients
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benefit compensation system affects the exit from
unemployment via either recall or the finding of a new
job. For this purpose, we have distinguished between
the unemployed receiving UI and those receiving UA,
since UI benefits are typically received by workers
with longer previous jobs (while UA benefits are
typically received by workers who do not meet the
minimum contribution period for UI eligibility). The
data set used contains information on the character-
istics of workers who became unemployed from
January to June 2000, their work history, unemploy-
ment duration and benefit-related variables.
Apart from the fact that individual characteristics
influence the recall and new job hazard rates differ-
ently, UI recipients leave unemployment sooner than
UA recipients (as expected). However, the former are
more likely to be recalled as the exhaustion of UI
approaches, at the point of benefit exhaustion and
after some months have passed since benefit exhaus-
tion. In contrast, the recall hazard rate among UA
recipients decreases as UA exhaustion approaches.
The indicated results suggest that the duration of
unemployment benefits has a strong influence on firm
recall policies and workers’ new job finding behav-
iour, which confirms the importance of distinguishing
between UI and UA benefit recipients when analysing
the transition from joblessness to employment. In
particular, the fact that the chances of being recalled
among UI recipients increase markedly around the
time of benefit exhaustion can be interpreted from
both the demand and the supply side of the market:
as the exhaustion of benefits approaches, firms
appear to time their recall decisions to coincide with
the benefit entitlement of their recalled workers. In
addition, no pattern is discernible among UA recip-
ients, whose exit rates increase after the benefit
exhaustion period. The fact that the exit of UA
recipients from unemployment is mainly observed
after the exhaustion of benefits suggests a context in
which firms are more interested in recalling UI
benefit recipients mainly because of their higher job
attachment. Therefore, firms recall UA benefit recip-
ients only after UI recipients have already been
recalled or re-employed elsewhere.
These results imply that it can be a joint decision of
both workers and their employers that determines
how the UCS is used. In particular, the finding that
firms do not recall workers until they are about to
exhaust their UI benefits suggests that, when the need
for a temporary employment adjustment arises,
employers may rely more on temporary lay-offs and
less on other adjustment mechanisms because they
can shift part of the cost of the adjustment to the
public purse through UI. From a policy point of
view, the risk that UI benefits may artificially
subsidize the regular use of recalls by employers
suggests a limit to benefit payments to temporarily
laid-off employees through administrative rules. In
this regard, the benefit administration would need to
assess the frequency of UI claims associated with
recalls that seem to have no real insurance function,
and the effectiveness of particular measures to limit
them (see, e.g. Jurajda, 2004).
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Appendix
Table A1. Sample selection
Number of individuals in the initial sample 79 265
Observations deleted due to:
 Non involuntary separation from the job 21 702
 Do not take up unemployment benefits 50 164
 Aged 52 o more year 460
Missing variables
 Sex 1
 Industry 1
 Entitlement period 5
 Unemployment benefit different from insurance or assistance 16
 Unemployment duration 30 days 920
Number of individuals in the sample used for the empirical analysis 5992
Table A2. Occupation category groups
Qualification level according to SS classification of jobs SS classification of jobs
High 1. Workers with university degree
2. Technical engineers, experts and qualified assistants
3. Administrative chiefs and of workshop
Upper intermediate 4. Non qualified assistants
5. Administrative officials
6. Secondary (Minor)
Lower intermediate 7. Administrative assistants
8. Officials of the first and the second
Low 9. Officials of third and specialists
10. Labourers
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Table A3. Discrete time duration model estimates by type of exit for the entire sample
New job Recall
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Gender (male 1) 0.376 0.041*** 0.127 0.060**
Age at unemployment spell 0.014 0.017 0.099 0.020***
(Age at unemployment spell)2 0.0003 0.000 0.002 0.000***
Qualification level
Qual. High 0.222 0.084*** 0.388 0.125***
Qual. Medium high
Qual. Medium low 0.086 0.059 0.041 0.095
Qual. Low 0.119 0.059** 0.091 0.090
Type of contract
Permanent contract
Discontinuous open ended contracts 0.087 0.157 2.397 0.163***
Temporary 0.154 0.057*** 1.148 0.128***
Other type 0.223 0.099** 1.447 0.159***
Firm size
10 employees
410 and 50 employees 0.124 0.046*** 0.163 0.074**
450 and 200 employees 0.137 0.058** 0.482 0.080***
4200 and 1000 employees 0.107 0.066 0.677 0.090***
41000 employees 0.137 0.101 1.007 0.111***
Worked in a THA 0.261 0.126** 0.091 0.196
Unemployment benefit status
UI (dummy)
UA (dummy) 0.188 0.051*** 0.293 0.068***
Time until exhaustion (months)
UB418
UB 12 18 0.177 0.099* 0.203 0.185
UB 5 11 0.184 0.090** 0.447 0.160***
UB 2 4 0.299 0.091*** 0.524 0.158***
UB1 0.341 0.112*** 0.471 0.183***
UB0 0.587 0.117*** 1.023 0.191***
UB 1 0.840 0.124*** 1.123 0.203***
UB 2 to 4 0.662 0.118*** 1.327 0.196***
UB 5 to 10 0.638 0.136*** 0.827 0.240***
UB4 10 0.756 0.204*** 0.747 0.436*
Number of previous jobs 0.072 0.018*** 0.122 0.022***
Number of children
0
1 0.269 0.054*** 0.131 0.075*
2 0.214 0.060*** 0.138 0.081*
3 0.469 0.102*** 0.039 0.129
Sector of activity
Manufacturing
Agriculture 0.432 0.301 0.539 0.360
Construction 0.075 0.066 0.181 0.099*
Services 0.084 0.052 0.169 0.072**
Regional unemployment rate (tvc) 0.015 0.014 0.077 0.021***
Mass points and probability
"1 (SE) 5.221 (1.227)***
"2 (SE) 3.170 (0.323)***
Pr("1) 0.031
Pr("2) 0.969
Number of observations 36 282
Number of individuals 5992
Log likelihood 18 202.53
Note: Regression includes controls for 17 regions, unemployment duration (in months) dummies variables (baseline), month
of entering unemployment. ‘TVC’ means time varying covariate.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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